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oAbstract
A heightened interest in understanding the remitting practices of immigrants and
their impact on a variety of economic indicators has emerged as remittances to
developing countries have risen substantially over the past decade. If remittances
primarily enhance consumption, they may have no lasting impact on economic
growth. However, through asset accumulation and human capital investment,
remittances may serve as a vehicle for growth. In this paper, we use the 2010 Nepal
Living Standards Survey III (NLSS III) to examine how remittances affect household
expenditures on human capital investment. Overall, our findings suggest that at the
margin, remittances do contribute to human capital investment, but this effect varies
substantially by school quality within Nepal. In addition, our results indicate that
internal remittances (remittances from household members migrating internally)
have a greater impact on education than do external remittances. We posit that this
may be due to a higher value placed on Nepali education by internal migrants as
compared to the education needed for foreign job opportunities by migrants abroad.
JEL codes: J61, I25, F22, F24, H52, O15
Keywords: Remittance; Education; Migration1 Introduction
A heightened interest in understanding the remitting practices of immigrants and their
impact on a variety of economic indicators has emerged as remittances to developing
countries have risen substantially over the past decade, in some cases surpassing devel-
opment assistance flows to developing countries (Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2005). In
Nepal, for example, the World Bank reports that remittances amounted to $5.6 billion
(US dollars) in 2013, or about 29% of GDP, while official development assistance and
aid totaled approximately $870.6 million (World Bank 2015). Scholars have long been
interested in how households use remittance income in developing countries (Lucas
1987). Certainly remittances received by a household relax the budget constraint and
may lead to increased consumption. If remittances primarily enhance consumption,
they may have no lasting impact on economic growth. However, remittances can foster
growth if remittances increase household investment through acquiring more educa-
tion, starting a small business or financing new agricultural technology (Woodruff,
2007; Nenova et al. 2009; Mendola 2008). Evidence of asset accumulation related to re-
mittances has piqued economists’ interest in remittances as a vehicle for economic
growth and development.2015 Bansak et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
riginal work is properly credited.
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ine how remittances affect household expenditures on education. As the direction and
size of the effect of remittances on human capital investment is unclear a priori, we
first examine the impact of remittance income on educational expenditures at the
household level. We then allow for the possibility that remittance funds are more likely
to be channeled to schooling where the return to education is highest. Examining dif-
ferences in school quality at the Nepali district level (a district is akin to a county in
most U.S. states), we find that, at the margin, remittances do positively impact human
capital investment, and more interestingly, the marginal impact is an increasing func-
tion of school quality. Therefore, the use of remittances to invest in human capital is
dependent on the returns to education.
Building on the work of Kandel and Kao (2000), we also examine the impact of the
source of the remittance income on the decision to invest in human capital. In their
work, they point out that education acquired in Mexico is more highly valued domes-
tically compared to opportunities abroad. If this is also the case in Nepal, we may see a
differential impact by the source of remittance income. The NLSS III dataset allows us
to identify whether remittance income comes from a migrant within Nepal or from a
migrant located in another country. We categorize the former as internal remittances
and the latter as external remittances. Our results provide evidence that the impact on
education spending is larger for internal remittances and this difference grows with
school quality.
2 Conceptual Framework and Previous Literature
The household decision to migrate for our purposes may conveniently be thought of in a
cost-benefit framework; the costs incurred by the household include travel and search costs
as a household member seeks employment in another community or country and the costs
of lost home production contributed by the migrating member. The benefits primarily come
in the form of increased income as remittances are returned to the household. Migration
occurs if the benefits outweigh the costs. For our Nepali sample in the NLSSIII, the net
benefit is positive for the vast majority of households as approximately seventy percent of
households have at least one family member absent during the time of the survey.
Migrants reveal that there are a number of reasons for remitting, such as consump-
tion smoothing, target saving, altruism, and insurance purposes (Amuedo-Dorantes
et al. 2005). Similarly, there are a number of uses for remittances ranging from con-
sumption on daily living expenses, paying back loans, investing in education, paying for
health expenses, funding a new business or building residential and nonresidential
structures. In this paper, we focus on the decision to invest remittances into human
capital and assess whether this choice is impacted by the quality of schools near the
household receiving the remittances and whether the migrant sending the funds resides
within Nepal or in another country.
In terms of our research question of interest, the relationship between remittances
and spending on education, there are potentially offsetting effects of migration and re-
mittances on human capital investment. On the one hand, increasing income through
remittances may increase investment in children’s schooling by relaxing household
budget and capital constraints. Conversely household absenteeism pressures children to
work in the home, reducing time for education.
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may have an impact on economic well-being. If the income enhances domestic invest-
ment spending on both physical and human capital, it may serve as a vehicle for eco-
nomic growth. In a macroeconomic growth accounting framework, growth occurs if
there are increases in the stock of labor, capital, or an improvement in total factor
productivity. If remittance income is invested in education, this may increase the quan-
tity and quality of workers, increasing total factor productivity and enhancing economic
growth. However, if remittances enable family members left behind to increase con-
sumption and stop working or labor quality deteriorates through brain drain, remit-
tances may act as a drag on growth. Thus, the net effect of remittances on economic
growth is not necessarily positive.
Not surprising, the empirical evidence on the impact of remittances on human capital
expenditures is mixed. Adams et al. (2008) find that households in Ghana do not spend
disproportionately from remittance income on education, food and other products.
Similarly, Robles and Oropesa (2011) find that a higher risk of migration tends to have
harmful effects on education for children remaining in the household using Peruvian
data. Meanwhile, Edwards and Ureta (2003) find a significant impact of remittances on
school retention in El Salvador. For the Philippines, Yang (2008) finds that positive ex-
change rate shocks affect remittances and lead to greater human capital investments.
In a broader study, Acosta et al. (2007) examined 11 Latin American countries and
found that the effect of remittances on education is often restricted to specific groups
within a population.
Some studies have examined remittance spending for boys and girls separately. The
results from these studies also vary widely. Acosta 2006 finds that young girls and boys
are more likely to be in school in households receiving remittances in El Salvador.
Bansak and Chezum (2009) find that although remittances increase the probability the
young are in school, girls benefit relatively less than boys, but suffer less harm from the
absenteeism caused by a household member’s migration to fund remittances. In more
recent work, Antman (2012) finds that parental emigration in Mexico significantly in-
creases educational attainment for girls. Migration of parents, however, lowers the
probability of boys completing junior high school and of boys and girls completing high
school.
Part of the differences in these findings may be directly related to the country under
study and variation in the returns to education domestically and abroad. Understanding
differences in local economic conditions for households and how these affect household
decisions may shed light on the use of remittance funds. Rational economic agents will
spend on those goods that, for a given price, provide the greatest household utility and
invest where the rate of return is highest. Empirical evidence that suggests that house-
holds receiving remittances invest less may simply be indicating that these households
are systematically located in areas with economic conditions that drive a low rate of
return on human capital investment.
Along these lines, recent research examines differences in spending patterns by the
source of remittance income focusing on differences between internal and external re-
mittances. If migrants return not only remittances but knowledge of new markets and/
or technologies, one may reasonably expect changes in spending patterns relative to
non-migrants (Mendola 2008). If the knowledge returned home differs systematically
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arise.
Empirical work that tests for different uses by source of funds generally finds a wide
range of results. Costaldo and Reilly (2007) find that households receiving external re-
mittances spend more at the margin on durable goods and utilities but less on food as
compared to households that receive no remittances. Mendola (2008) finds that agri-
cultural households engaging in international migration are more likely to invest in
high-yield seed technology as compared to households with internal migrants or no mi-
grants. She argues that high-yield seed, although producing higher average productivity
also has a greater variance in output. International migration serves as a more effective
insurance mechanism for these households, separating them from households who are
not insured and therefore fall back on relatively low-yield, low variance seed. Adams
et al. (2008) also look for differences based on the source of remittance income but find
no differences in Ghana.
In terms of investments in education specifically, empirical evidence suggests that
households are more likely to invest in education when the funds are derived from in-
ternal sources. Kandel and Kao (2000) find that the migration of household individuals
and families in Mexico positively impacts children’s aspirations to someday migrate to
the U.S. for work. Aspirations to work in the U.S., in turn, actually negatively impact
potential investment in education in Mexico because migrants abroad find that
Mexican education is not highly valued in the U.S. Taylor and Mora (2006) also use
data from Mexico and find that households who receive internal remittances invest
relatively more in education compared to those who receive external remittances.
Thus, for our study of Nepali migration, we might also expect systematic differences
in education if remittances are generated internally versus externally. In particular, if
Nepali education is valued differentially abroad as compared to domestically, then we
should see corresponding differences in education spending across remittance sources.
By examining pass rates of the “School Leaving Exam” and receipt of the “School
Leaving Certificate” at the district level, we find suggestive evidence that there is a
differential in spending remittance income on education based on the source of the
remittances. (Nepal’s school leaving exam is akin to New York State's Regents Exam,
where those high school students passing the exam receive a Regents Degree.)1
Table 1 examines the relationship between where remittances come from and the
SLC Pass Rate. The top panel gives the top ten districts ranked by frequency of receiv-
ing internal remittances in our data. The final column shows the district rank by SLC
passing rate. The average rank for these districts was 16.6. The bottom panel shows
similar data for the top ten external remittance-receiving districts and their associated
rank in SLC pass rate. Here we see an average rank of 37.8, which is affected substan-
tially by one outlier (Gulmi).
These results suggest that internal remittances go to households in districts having
higher SLC passing rates or a better (lower) SLC pass rate ranking. Further note that
seven of the top ten internal remittance districts share a border with Kathmandu (as in-
dicated by the * in the table) with only Udayapur being located more than one district
away from Kathmandu. Taken together, internal remittances go to households near the
country’s capital and to districts with higher quality schools as measured by achieve-
ment on the SLC exam.
Table 1 Remittance source and school performance
























*Indicates a border with Kathmandu
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not observe of similar pattern of funds and SLC rankings. In essence, external funds
are not disproportionately going to households in districts in Nepal with relatively
higher SLC pass rates. Specifically, no top external remittance receiving districts share
a border with Kathmandu, and all have more than three districts to cross in reaching
Kathmandu. (Districts are not of uniform size, we offer this only as an approximation
to the distance from Kathmandu.) Ultimately, it appears that internal migrants in Nepal
are from districts where the SLC pass rate (or returns to education) is relatively high,
while external migrants are from districts where the SLC pass rate (or returns to educa-
tion) is relatively low.
3 Methodology
We explore how remittances affect human capital formation, treating the level of remit-
tances first as exogenous and then allowing for the possibility that remittance amounts
may be endogenous to the investment decision. Specifically, we estimate the relation-
ship between household human capital expenditures and the level of remittance and re-
port results estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV).
We control for the quality of the educational infrastructure through the performance
of students in the district on the Nepal School Leaving Exam; individuals who pass the
exam are awarded a “School Leaving Certificate” (SLC throughout the remainder of the
Table 2 Tests of difference in means for subsamples
Remit (n = 3178) Noremit (n = 2810) Difference Standard error
Education spending 14.22 19.53 −5.314*** −1.528
Remittance income 104.39
SLC pass rate 57.96 60.88 −2.929*** −0.397
Number remitters 1.62
Urban 0.279 0.402 −0.123*** −0.0121
Share ages 4-7 0.0831 0.0767 0.00642* −0.00323
Share ages 8-15 0.193 0.183 0.01 −0.00515
Share ages 16-64 0.576 0.61 −0.0341*** −0.00651
Share elderly 0.0776 0.0664 0.0113* −0.00461
Farm income 1.916 2.935 −1.019 −1.236
Business income 60.62 80.52 −19.89 −19.54
Wage income 36.52 75.90 −39.37*** −4.10
Married couples 0.77 1.082 −0.312*** −0.0175
Household production 5.581 5.086 0.495** −0.19
External (n = 1718) Internal (n = 1989) Difference Standard Error
Education spending 14.69 14.07 0.625 −1.029
Remittance income 129.9 54.61 75.26** −28.05
SLC pass rate 57.8 57.82 −0.0191 −0.471
Number remitters 1.732 1.817 −0.0853* −0.0356
Urban 0.274 0.265 0.00862 −0.0146
Share ages 4-7 0.0921 0.0771 0.0150*** −0.0043
Share ages 8-15 0.205 0.182 0.0227*** −0.00675
Share ages 16-64 0.557 0.586 −0.0290*** −0.00842
Share elderly 0.0697 0.0844 −0.0146* −0.00601
Farm income 2.984 1.436 1.548 −2.239
Business income 36.17 74.59 −38.42 −28.95
Wage income 30.31 39.35 −9.04** −3.06
Married couples 0.692 0.814 −0.123*** −0.0239
Household production 5.487 5.771 −0.285 −0.25
Noremit (n = 2810) Internal (n = 1989) Difference Standard Error
Education spending 19.53 14.07 5.460** −1.897
Remittance income
SLC pass rate 60.88 57.82 3.062*** −0.451
Number remitters 0 1.817 −1.817*** −0.0209
Urban 0.402 0.265 0.137*** −0.0138
Share ages 4-7 0.0767 0.0771 −0.000401 −0.00353
Share ages 8-15 0.183 0.182 0.00112 −0.0057
Share ages 16-64 0.61 0.586 0.0238** −0.00735
Share elderly 0.0664 0.0844 −0.0180*** −0.00534
Farm income 2.935 1.436 1.499 −1.304
Business income 80.52 74.59 5.926 −24.54
Wage income 75.89 39.35 36.54*** −5.02
Married couples 1.082 0.814 0.268*** −0.0195
Household production 5.086 5.771 −0.685** −0.223
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Table 2 Tests of difference in means for subsamples (Continued)
Noremit (n = 2810) External (n = 1718) Difference Standard Error
Education spending 19.53 14.69 4.835* −2.035
Remittance income
SLC pass rate 60.88 57.8 3.081*** −0.482
Number remitters 0 1.732 −1.732*** −0.0198
Urban 0.402 0.274 0.129*** −0.0145
Share ages 4-7 0.0767 0.0921 −0.0154*** −0.00383
Share ages 8-15 0.183 0.205 −0.0216*** −0.00608
Share ages 16-64 0.61 0.557 0.0528*** −0.00755
Share elderly 0.0664 0.0697 −0.00339 −0.00511
Farm income 2.935 2.984 −0.0487 −1.613
Business income 80.52 36.17 44.35*** −11.8
Wage income 75.89 30.31 45.58*** −53.284
Married couples 1.082 0.692 0.391*** −0.0203
Household production 5.086 5.487 −0.4 −0.225
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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tion spending and also at the same time show how the impact of remittances are
dependent on the returns to education. Our main specification is:
Educationid ¼ β0 þ β1 Remitið Þ þ β2 SLC Pass Ratedð Þ þ β3 SLC Pass Rated  Remitið Þ
þ Xiβþ εi;
where the dependent variable measures the spending on Education for a given house-
hold (in 1000s of rupees); Remit measures the total level of remittance income for
households that reported receiving any remittances and includes in-kind transfers (in
1000s of rupees); SLC Pass Rate is the district level (denoted by subscript d) passing
rate on the school leaving exam for 2006 (in percentages); SLC Pass Rate*Remit is the
interaction between the passing rate and the level of remittances; and finally X repre-
sents a vector of covariates. In this framework, β1 and β3 are our parameters of interest
and allow for the marginal impact of remittances to vary with school quality at the dis-
trict level.
It is likely the impact of remittances may be biased because of endogeneity and the
direction of this bias is uncertain. First, high ability individuals may have better pros-
pects when migrating (either internally or externally). If these high ability individuals
are more likely to send their children to school, then we should expect an upward bias
in the estimated impact of remittances on education spending. On the other hand, if
negative job shocks not accounted for in the model push individuals to migrate, the es-
timated impact of remittances on human capital choices will be biased downward. A
negative job shock likely increases the probability of migrating to remit while at the
same time the absenteeism induces more household members into home production
and out of school. To account for the potential endogeneity, we estimate the model via
instrumental variables methods.
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Using data from the NLSS III, we construct an initial sample of 5,988 households
who responded to the survey. The NLSS III contains information on the extent, na-
ture and determinants of poverty in Nepal, covering different aspects of household
welfare including education and remittances. The survey asks each household to pro-
vide information on the amount spent on education for each family member cur-
rently in school. The variable Education Spending is the sum of all local education
expenditures identified in the survey. As shown in the top panel of Table 2, educa-
tion spending averages about 14,200 rupees (or about 140 U.S. dollars) for those who
receive remittances. This sample of 3,178 household is our main sample that we use
in our regressions and computations of marginal effects, which are later presented in
Tables 3 and 4.
For remittances, each household is asked if they have received a remittance from any
individual in the last twelve months and the origin of the funds. We define respectively
Remittance, Internal Remittance and External Remittance Income as the total of all
cash and in-kind remittances from all sources, internal sources and external sources re-
spectively (all stated in 1000s of rupees). In the sample, among 5,988 households, 3,178
(roughly 53%) received some remittance income. Of the 3,178 receiving a remittance,
1,989 (47%) received funds from at least one internal source, 1,718 (41%) received
funds from an external (outside Nepal) source and 529 received funds from both an in-
ternal and external source.
Remittances have the impact of relaxing household budget constraints, but at
the cost of removing a household member and thereby lowering household pro-
duction. The NLSSIII identifies each individual who provides remittances to a
household and allows us to calculate the total number of remitters (Number Re-
mitters), which we use as a control for absenteeism. For our sample of remitters,
the average number of remitters is 1.62 individuals per household. Additionally,
we include the variable Household Production, defined as the monetary value of
goods produced for home consumption within the household, to control for the
importance of home production to the household. The average value produced
for households receiving remittances, our primary sample, is just over 5,500 ru-
pees per year.
To estimate the impact of remittance income on education expenditures, we include
variables controlling for household income from three sources and household age
structure and family structure. For each household we define Farm Income, Business In-
come and Wage Income as the total family net income from each of the three sources
mentioned (each divided by 1,000). Presumably, income proxies for worker productivity
in the household and therefore is an indicator of ability. In the NLSSIII, farm income
averages 1,900 rupees, business income average 60,600 rupees and wage income gener-
ates about 36,500 rupees per year for households in our sample of remittance recipi-
ents. Thus, business and wage income are predominant sources of income and dwarf
household production.
Age composition of the household is captured through the variables Share Ages 4–7,
Share Ages 8–15, Share Ages 16–64 and Share Elderly. Individuals between 4 and 15
are school aged, with the younger group (ages 4 to 7) attending early education, while
those between 8 and 15 are eligible for secondary education in Nepal. Individuals aged
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education or an advanced degree. The summary statistics in Table 2 indicate that most
members (58%) in remittance-receiving households are between the ages of 16 and 64.
For non-recipient households, however, the share of the working age population is even
larger (61%), suggesting that absenteeism does result in a larger share of very young
and very old members remaining in the household in our main sample of households
receiving remittances.
To capture family structure, we include Married Couples, defined as the number of
married couples in the household. This variable allows for differences in the total num-
ber of unique families within the extended household. Finally, we include the variable
Urban, defined as equal to one if the household is in a district near a major population
center (a town with over 100,000 inhabitants) and zero otherwise to account for the
possibility that urban centers may generally have better education infrastructure. Just
under 30 percent of our sample of recipients resides in urban locations.
Summary statistics in Table 2 are decomposed into four various subsamples for com-
parison purposes. The top panel of the table breaks the sample between those receiving
remittances (our main sample) and those not; the means for each subsample are in the
first two columns, the difference is in the third and the standard error of the difference
appears in the final column. The second panel shows differences between households
receiving external and internal remittances, and the final two panels compare these
groups to households that do not receive remittances.
As a first step in our analysis, we begin by comparing the means of the different sub-
groups. We observe that households not receiving remittances, on average, spend more
on education. They are also more likely to reside in urban locations and in districts
with significantly higher SLC pass rates. Households receiving remittances, typically,
have lower wage incomes, fewer working-age and married couples, and are more reliant
on household production (each of these differences are significant at the 5% level or
lower).
Restricting our analysis to only those households receiving remittances, as shown in
the second panel, we observe that the rupee amount of external remittances is more
than twice as large as that for internal remittances. Those who receive remittances
from abroad receive the equivalent of approximately 130,000 rupees a year in cash or
in-kind transfers compared to 54,600 rupees for those receiving internal remittances.
For education spending, the difference in means is not statistically significant. House-
holds receiving external remittances also have more school aged children, fewer work-
ing aged members, and have fewer married couples.
In the final 3rd and 4th panels, we compare the non-recipient households to house-
holds receiving internal and external remittances, respectively. For these subgroups, the
patterns in observable differences between the household types are qualitatively the
same to those in the top panel.
Given the observed differences among these subgroups, we include these variables as con-
trols in our multivariate analysis. These covariates allow us to address observed variation in
household composition that may affect the decision to invest in education. However, there
may be omitted variables and other unobserved characteristics that are correlated with edu-
cation spending and remittances. To address these possibilities, we use instrumental vari-
able techniques and alternative samples as robustness tests for our main specification.
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between the household types is always a challenge in this literature. To account for the
potential endogeneity of the remittance decision, we need instruments that are corre-
lated with the level and probability of a remittance, but not education spending. Our
chosen instruments are measures of past social unrest and past migration experiences.
For the former measure, the instruments are intended to proxy for historic volatility
caused by the Nepali civil war in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. For the latter, we use
a proxy for the possibility that a household may be aware of migration opportunities.
We believe that volatility caused by Nepal’s civil war created an exogenous shock at
the local level that pushed households to migrate. This enhanced migration pressure
generated a long-term effect by introducing households to migration opportunities.
During the civil war the Nepalese government classified the degree of insurgent pres-
sure/control from high to low as Class A, Class B, and Class C at the district level. Un-
classified districts have little or no insurgent activity, while Class A has the highest
degree of insurgent control. Of the households in our sample, 3.65% live in districts
categorized as Class A, 12.81% in Class B, and 16.02% in Class C districts. We use these
definitions to define our instruments as dummy variables (Hatlebakk 2007), which re-
flect the intensity of the civil war within a district.
Following previous literature (Hanson and Woodruff 2003; Acosta et al. 2007), we
use the past migration experience of local social groups as a proxy for network effects
as an instrument. Networks formed from past migration experiences may lower the
costs of finding jobs and result in higher instances and larger volumes of remittances.
Using the NLSS II (the 2003 version of this survey), we are able to identify the source
location and caste or ethnic group of each individual migrant identified in a household.
We then measure the rate of migration by caste for each district using this data. By
breaking down migration to a local/social network, we believe the instrument reflects
the information available on potential migration networks at the local level. The result-
ing variable is matched to households by caste of the household head and district. The
mean migration/caste rate is 17.7 percent with a standard deviation of 14.4 percent, a
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 76.9 percent, indicating a wide variation in the past
migration experience at the district and caste level.
5 Results
Turning to our multivariate regression analysis, we focus on the impact of remittance
income on a family’s investment in education spending. Our specifications allow for dif-
ferential investments by school quality and source of remittances, and we limit our sam-
ple to households that receive remittances. Therefore, we do not explicitly model or
examine the decision to migrate or the decision to remit. The resulting potential for selec-
tion bias may be a cause for concern, and the results presented here may not be
generalizable to the entire Nepali population. Nonetheless, it should be noted that ap-
proximately 70% of Nepali households have at least one migrant household member,
and 53% receive remittance income. This near universality of migration and receipt of
remittances implies that our results remain pertinent to an ever-increasing majority of
the Nepali households.
Table 3 presents results examining the impact of the level of remittance income on
education spending at the household level (Appendix 1). Columns 1 and 2 provide the
Table 3 Education spending as a function of remittance income and school quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Remittance income 0.002 0.033 0.002 0.095*** −0.023 −0.217
(1.52) (1.46) (1.62) (3.72) (−1.62) (−1.47)
SLC pass rate* 0.0005* 0.004**
Remittance (1.68) (1.99)
SLC pass rate 0.307*** 0.118** 0.245*** −0.230
(7.78) (2.51) (6.01) (−1.11)
Number remitter 1.180** 10.316* 1.229** −6.462 1.134** 16.302
(2.27) (1.83) (2.37) (−1.20) (2.31) (1.11)
Urban household 18.668*** 17.744*** 15.699*** 10.345*** 15.325*** 13.083***
(12.62) (8.50) (12.53) (6.15) (12.36) (4.91)
Share 4 to 7 24.555*** 31.943*** 23.785*** 22.401*** 24.031*** 35.804***
(7.38) (5.81) (7.22) (3.68) (7.23) (2.75)
Share 8 to 15 33.021*** 36.987*** 32.399*** 31.734*** 32.922*** 47.420***
(13.84) (7.20) (13.63) (5.24) (13.67) (3.53)
Share 16 to 64 25.589*** 27.528*** 23.300*** 20.027*** 23.405*** 29.641***
(7.41) (6.09) (7.09) (4.21) (7.08) (3.22)
Share elderly 10.937*** 9.324** 8.891*** 15.279*** 9.724*** 17.657**
(4.72) (2.27) (3.85) (3.00) (4.15) (2.13)
Farm income −0.003 0.002 −0.003 0.000 −0.003 −0.000
(−0.84) (0.48) (−0.80) (0.07) (−0.76) (−0.09)
Enterprise income 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.83) (0.82) (0.98) (1.55) (0.99) (0.92)
Wage income 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.042***
(3.84) (3.12) (3.52) (3.40) (3.56) (2.67)
Married couples 1.053 0.548 1.278* 1.765* 1.332* 2.326
(1.53) (0.60) (1.88) (1.72) (1.92) (1.55)
Home production −0.165*** −0.259*** −0.150*** −0.044 −0.141*** −0.181
(−3.58) (−3.58) (−3.48) (−0.54) (−3.29) (−1.30)
Constant −18.245*** −37.442*** −33.764*** −17.168 −30.846*** −40.488*
(−6.08) (−3.41) (−7.64) (−1.57) (−7.42) (−1.90)
Observations 3,178 3,178 3,178 3,178 3,178 3,178
Hansen’s J 3.043 7.773 2.463
p-value 0.218 0.0205 0.117
First stage F
Remittance income 4.552 5.920 5.920
Number remitter 6.085 6.697 6.697
SLC*Remittance 6.828
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Bansak et al. IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:16 Page 11 of 19base estimates, examining the impact of remittances not controlling for school quality
for OLS and IV specifications. While we see a positive impact in both OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2), the results are not statistically significant at conventional levels
(Appendix 2). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the IV results indicate a negative
Table 4 Marginal effect of remittances on education by SLC pass rate percentiles (Based in
columns 5 & 6 of Table 3)
Percentile SLC pass rate OLS IV*
Minimum 18.00 −0.0140 −0.1370
Jajarkot (0.009) (0.108)
10 41.79 −0.0021 −0.0315
Mahottari (0.002) (0.059)
25 47.49 0.0008 −0.0062
Kailali (0.000) (0.049)
50 55.81 0.0049** 0.0306
Dhanusa (0.002) (0.036)
75 72.32 0.0132* 0.1039**
Kavre (0.007) (0.035)
90 83.71 0.0189* 0.1544**
Kathmandu (0.011) (0.053)
Maximum 84.18 0.0192* 0.1565**
(Gulmi) (0.011) (0.053)
*Coefficients in IV are significant at the 5 % level, OLS at the 10 % level
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two-tailed test at the 15% level, the IV results indicate a marginal effect of a 33 rupee
increase in education spending for a 1,000 rupee increase in remittance income. The
number of remitters, urban location, and wage income also positively contribute to
education spending. Interestingly, the magnitude of the impact of wage income is simi-
lar to that of remittance income in the instrumental variables regression. For those who
are more reliant on home production, investment in education is lower.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 include the SLC Pass Rate as a proxy for school quality.
First we note that the coefficients on both Remittance and SLC Pass Rate are positive
and statistically significant in OLS and IV specifications. The results indicate while
higher remittances continue to increase education spending, school quality matters. A
1 percentage point increase in school quality is expected to increase education spend-
ing by about 307 rupees, while an additional 1,000 rupees in remittances has an insig-
nificant impact on education spending (we note the similarity of coefficients between
columns 1 and 3 as well). Under the IV estimates, a 1 percentage point increase in SLC
Pass Rate is expected to increase education spending by 118 rupees while an additional
1,000 rupees in remittance income is expected to increase education spending by 95 ru-
pees. The evidence clearly indicates a positive impact of school quality on education
spending; it then seems natural to ask if, at the margin, higher school quality encour-
ages spending from remittance income?
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 address this question by including the interaction
between SLC Pass Rate and Remittances. The results are strikingly different. We first
observe that the direct effect of remittances is negative and larger for the IV results
(although insignificant in both specifications at conventional levels). In both specifica-
tions, the interaction term is positive and significant. Thus, it seems that a greater share
of remittance income is spent on education in districts where the quality of education
is higher. This is consistent with human capital theory which posits that individuals (or
Bansak et al. IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:16 Page 13 of 19in this case households) will spend on education up to the point that the marginal cost
is equal to the marginal reward. In districts where school quality is higher, we expect a
higher return at the margin and therefore more spending on education.2
Using the results from Table 3, we consider the marginal effect of remittances on
education spending given by computing the following:
∂Education
∂Remittance
¼ b1 þ b3 SLCPassRateð Þ:
Table 4 evaluates this marginal effect at various percentiles of the SLC Pass Rate, andFig. 1 graphs the marginal effect over the range of the SLC Pass Rate, where b1, b3 are
the point estimates of the coefficients of our population regression function outlined
above. In Table 4, we see that the marginal effect under IV increases at higher levels
of the SLC Pass Rate. Or, in other words, there is a rising effect of remittance income
on education spending as the quality of education in a district grows. The marginal effect
ranges from −0.014 to 0.019 for the OLS results and -.137 to 0.157 for the IV results, indi-
cating a large and increasing impact of remittances over the range of SLC pass rates. For
the IV estimates, an increase of 1000 rupees in remittances results in a 30 to 150 rupee in-
crease in spending on education for schools that are performing at the median or above.
There is no significant impact of remittances on education spending for households that
reside in districts with schools performing below the median. Fig. 1 displays this relation-
ship in a continuous fashion, where the marginal effect is upward sloping and steeper for
the IV estimate compared to the OLS result.
In Tables 5 and 6 we present results estimating separate models for internal and ex-
ternal remittances. As mentioned earlier, we might expect systematic differences in
education across remittances generated internally versus those generated externally. In
particular, if Nepali education is valued differentially abroad as compared to domestic-
ally, then we should see corresponding differences in education spending across remit-
tance sources. As seen in Table 5, the estimates are striking; while both the direct and
interaction effects of remittances are statistically significant for internal remittances
(presented in columns 1 and 2), external remittances are found to have no statistically
significant impact on education spending. The negative sign on the remittance variableFig. 1 Marginal Effects of Remittances by School Quality
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seen for the pooled results presented in Tables 3 and 4 and Fig. 1. Fig. 2 is a
reproduction of the estimates in Fig. 1, where we allow for differences resulting from the
source of remittances. Given the positive slopes associated with internal remittances and
the near horizontal relationship for external remittances, it appears that the earlier results
are driven by internal remittances.
Table 6 presents the marginal effects of remittances on education spending at various
percentiles of the SLC Pass Rate similar to the results presented in Table 4. We see com-
parable results for those receiving internal remittances. The marginal impact is larger
in districts with better performing schools. Further, we observe that the marginal effect
of internal remittances is systematically higher when compared to external remittances
in both OLS and IV results. This is highlighted in Fig. 2, where we have plotted the
marginal effect against the SLC Pass Rate. The marginal effects for internal remittances,
shown in short dashes, are generally above and steeper than the corresponding esti-
mates for external remittances.
Although other interpretations may exist, the results are consistent with the premise
that Nepali education is valued more highly within Nepal than abroad as in Kandel and
Kao (2000). If children in a household with adult internal migrants are more likely to
“follow in these footsteps,” then these households should invest more heavily in educa-
tion because of the higher expected return to education for jobs inside Nepal. Mean-
while, for those with household members abroad, they may learn from relatives that a
Nepali education is not valued as highly in other countries and may be discouraged
from pursuing additional schooling if they plan to move abroad as well and to connect
with other household or community members through established migrant networks.
6 Conclusions
Overall, we find that remittances are linked to human capital investment in Nepal and that
the positive link or marginal impact is greater where the returns to education are higher.
The results appear to be driven by differences in the returns on investment in the origin-
ating areas and from internal migrants. In other words, Nepali households invest in educa-
tion, and the strength of the effect is dependent on the quality of schooling near aFig. 2 Marginal Effects of Remittances by School Quality: Internal vs. External Source
Table 5 Education spending as a function of remittance income and school quality, internal vs.
external remittance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables OLS IV OLS IV
Internal remittance −0.119* −0.619***
(−1.95) (−3.04)
SLC pass rate* 0.003** 0.013***
Internal remittance (1.97) (2.99)
External remittance 0.002 0.139
(0.09) (0.88)
SLC pass rate* 0.0001 0.00005
External remittance (0.45) (0.03)
SLC pass rate 0.214*** −0.231 0.292*** 0.005
(3.81) (−1.54) (5.27) (0.03)
Number remitter 1.466** 17.838*** 1.018 −8.200
(2.51) (2.83) (1.35) (−0.99)
Urban household 15.243*** 11.444*** 16.691*** 9.016*
(9.75) (4.92) (8.53) (1.69)
Share 4 to 7 27.072*** 35.276*** 22.444*** 26.393**
(5.97) (3.97) (5.37) (2.16)
Share 8 to 15 32.390*** 43.753*** 33.341*** 33.816***
(11.21) (5.07) (9.95) (3.21)
Share 16 to 64 23.257*** 23.181*** 25.114*** 19.994*
(5.65) (3.13) (4.71) (1.95)
Share elderly 9.658*** 11.659 10.309*** 21.662**
(3.45) (1.51) (2.97) (1.99)
Farm income −0.005 −0.007 0.002 0.006
(−1.01) (−0.95) (0.51) (0.88)
Enterprise income 0.000 0.001 0.009** 0.004
(0.71) (0.87) (1.97) (0.70)
Wage income 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.016
(2.07) (2.70) (2.24) (0.92)
Married couples 1.752* 4.904*** 1.032 1.504
(1.93) (2.77) (1.06) (0.67)
Home production −0.126** −0.244* −0.177*** 0.014
(−2.39) (−1.93) (−2.65) (0.07)
Constant −30.310*** −42.524*** −34.292*** −16.082
(−5.41) (−2.97) (−5.21) (−1.11)
Observations 1,989 1,989 1,718 1,718
Hansen’s J 0.216 0.0101
p-value 0.642 0.920
First stage F
Remittance income 0.302 2.153
Number remitter 1.054 2.326
SLC*Remittance 7.056 4.339
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6 Marginal effect of remittances on education by SLC pass rate percentiles
Internal External
Percentile SLC pass rate OLS IV OLS IV
Minimum 18.00 −0.073** −0.393*** 0.004 0.140
Jajarkot (0.04) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13)
10 41.79 −0.014** −0.095** 0.007 0.141
Mahottari (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.09)
25 47.49 0.001** −0.023 0.008 0.141*
Kailali (0.00007) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08)
50 55.81 0.022** 0.081** 0.009** 0.142**
Dhanusa (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.07)
75 72.32 0.063** 0.288*** 0.011** 0.143**
Kavre (0.03) (0.11) (0.01) (0.06)
90 83.71 0.092** 0.430*** 0.013 0.143**
Kathmandu (0.05) (0.15) (0.01) (0.06)
Maximum 84.18 0.093** 0.436*** 0.013 0.143**
(Gulmi) (0.05) (0.16) (0.01) (0.06)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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on education as compared to external remittances. Although we are not able to directly test
the proposition, if households who receive remittances from internal migrants are more
likely to migrate internally then we should expect a greater investment in education if do-
mestic employers value a Nepali education more than foreign employers.
Our results appear to be most consistent with the findings of Kandel and Kao (2000)
and Taylor and Mora (2006), who find that internal remittances have a greater impact
on investment in education. However, other studies, for example Adams et al. (2008),
Mendola (2008) and Costaldo and Reilly (2007) find either no difference or that exter-
nal remittances have a greater impact. Acosta et al. (2007) conclude that the findings
for any one country may not be generalized outside that country or specific region.
These mixed conclusions force researchers to ask what local characteristics cause dif-
ferences in the use of remittance income. Ultimately, our results show us that a lack of
homogeneity in economic conditions both within and across developing countries cre-
ates an additional challenge in understanding the role of remittances on household
choices and therefore development outcomes.Endnotes
1Nepal’s Ministry of Education periodically collect records on the number of individ-
uals who take the exam and the number that pass each year. We obtained 2006 data on
the passing rate at the district level. For each district we are able to measure the SLC
Pass Rate as the percentage of individuals taking the SLC exam who passed. There is
wide variation in performance across the districts. While the mean is roughly 57%, per-
formance ranges from a low 18% to a high of 84%.
2Table 3 also presents the first stage F-values for our endogenous variables and other
diagnostics such as Hansen’s J and the corresponding p-value.
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Table 7 presents results for the specifications presented in Table 2 using the full sample
of 5,988 households.Table 7 Education spending as a function of remittance income and school quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Remittance income 0.001 0.048 0.001 0.127*** −0.020 −0.450***
(1.33) (1.13) (1.42) (2.60) (−1.49) (−2.76)
SLC pass rate* 0.0004 0.009***
Remittance (1.54) (3.30)
SLC pass rate 0.406*** 0.226*** 0.381*** −0.093
(6.23) (4.29) (5.70) (−0.81)
Number remitter 0.902* 2.809 1.069** −19.902*** 0.840* −3.070
(1.89) (0.59) (2.23) (−3.52) (1.87) (−0.40)
Urban household 20.350*** 20.437*** 15.611*** 9.040*** 15.510*** 13.659***
(9.99) (7.46) (9.81) (4.39) (9.74) (4.77)
Share 4 to 7 28.213*** 32.199*** 27.438*** 16.064*** 27.514*** 28.912***
(6.11) (6.29) (6.00) (2.88) (6.01) (3.02)
Share 8 to 15 47.142*** 48.835*** 46.433*** 32.191*** 46.689*** 54.098***
(6.08) (6.33) (6.07) (4.46) (6.11) (4.71)
Share 16 to 64 35.611*** 36.803*** 32.240*** 22.153*** 32.312*** 34.391***
(7.08) (6.98) (6.98) (4.47) (7.00) (4.28)
Share elderly 21.080*** 20.452*** 17.932*** 18.389*** 18.372*** 28.238***
(4.72) (4.20) (4.34) (3.10) (4.46) (3.39)
Farm income −0.014 −0.010 −0.012 −0.004 −0.012 −0.014
(−1.43) (−1.17) (−1.42) (−0.41) (−1.41) (−1.31)
Enterprise income 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008
(1.31) (1.21) (1.33) (1.63) (1.33) (1.45)
Wage income 0.023** 0.022** 0.019** 0.021** 0.020** 0.023**
(2.54) (2.57) (2.19) (2.41) (2.20) (2.35)
Married couples 8.647 10.540** 8.776 0.457 8.852 12.208**
(1.60) (2.02) (1.62) (0.10) (1.64) (2.02)
Home production −0.271*** −0.348*** −0.213** 0.006 −0.212** −0.212*
(−2.83) (−3.35) (−2.36) (0.07) (−2.35) (−1.71)
Constant −32.949*** −39.680*** −53.410*** −13.469 −52.171*** −31.640**
(−3.65) (−3.66) (−4.53) (−1.35) (−4.41) (−2.44)
Observations 5,988 5,988 5,988 5,988 5,988 5,988
Hansen’s J 0.927 7.954 0.799
p-value 0.629 0.0187 0.371
First stage F:
Remittance income 7.751 6.741 6.741
Number remitter 16.54 20.14 20.14
SLC*Remittance 7.028
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 8 provides the first stage estimates of the instrumental variable regressionsTable 8 First stage estimates for IV estimation
(2) (3) (4)
Variables Remittance SLC Pass Rate * Remit IV
SLC pass rate 0.710 168.156*** −0.002*
(0.61) (2.65) (−1.82)
Urban household 25.933 1945.060 −0.091**
(1.17) (1.54) (−1.96)
Share 4 to 7 −40.249 −2673.915 −0.688***
(−0.74) (−0.66) (−3.48)
Share 8 to 15 60.421 1820.742 −0.532***
(0.49) (0.29) (−3.16)
Share16 to 64 29.739 1164.112 −0.340***
(0.44) (0.30) (−2.10)
Share elderly 82.661 2436.116 0.088
(0.47) (0.28) (0.46)
Farm income −0.149 −7.627 0.0003
(−1.15) (−1.21) (−1.01)
Enterprise income 0.002 0.097 0.00001
(0.47) (0.38) (0.25)
Wage income 0.213 10.224 0.0003
(0.86) (0.83) (−1.48)
Married couples 13.685 544.111 0.014
(0.50) (0.40) (0.50)
Home production 1.999 86.977 0.009**
(0.88) (0.76) (1.95)
Class A −49.823 −600.459 −0.354***
(−0.83) (−0.21) (−4.74)
Class B −65.691** −3744.811** −0.074
(−1.81) (−2.13) (−1.41)
Class C −41.605 −2338.092 −0.131***
(−1.40) (−1.60) (−2.91)
Migration rate −83.973 −4244.088 −0.036
(−0.81) (−0.86) (−0.31)
Constant 26.553 −4581.797 2.130
(0.82) (−2.04) (11.86)
Observations 5,988 5,988 5,988
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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